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This paper addresses the extant and arguably excessive focus on routines in management 
accounting research, and a relative neglect of rules. It seeks to advance our understanding 
of how rules and routines may interact, in the technology-enabled context of management 
accounting and control of contemporary organisations. 
 
Design/methodology/approach 
We draw on, and develop, insights from extant literature and from two case studies to 
explore how rules and routines may interact.  
 
Findings 
We propose a framework on the interactions of rules and routines across multiple 
dimensions. We adopt a wide notion of rules to include formal rules, rules as internal 
cognitive structures of human actors, and rules technologically embedded in non-human 
actors. We argue that rules underlie and may precede routines, distinguish between 




This research shows how the process of routinization and, ultimately, institutionalization 
of practices involves multiple dimensions of rules, as well as both human and non-human 
actors. With this understanding, researchers and practitioners will be better equipped to, 
respectively, understand nuances of management accounting change and actually achieve 
change in practice. 
 
Originality value 
This paper highlights the importance of rules in the routinization and institutionalization 
of management accounting practices and proposes a framework which explores the 
interactions of rules and routines across three realms: material, action and psychological. 
Including a material realm, related with technologically embedded rules, in the proposed 
framework contributes to institutional theory by acknowledging today’s increasing role 
of technology in organizational life. 
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In the stream of institutional theory focusing on organisational level processes, Old-
Institutional Economics (OIE), popular frameworks relating institutions, routines, rules 
and practices tend to suggest treating rules and routines in a holistic way, and tend to 
emphasize routines over rules – the latter of which tend to be conceptualized as formal 
rules (Burns and Scapens, 2000, Lukka, 2007 and van der Steen, 2011).  
Our two independent case studies on management accounting and organizational change 
(Oliveira, 2010; Quinn, 2010) drew on differing theoretical components of OIE. Although 
there were many similarities between our cases, Oliveira (2010) used rules as a medium 
to explain change, while Quinn (2011, 2010) used routines. We separately unbundled the 
holistic nature of rules and routines, in a sense not perhaps envisaged by previous 
management accounting researchers. In fact, had we treated rules and routines as a 
‘whole’, we might have missed important nuances not addressed in the literature to date. 
In addition, differences between our cases suggested explanations for different relative 
importance of rules and routines in change processes. 
This paper is guided by advances in conceptualizations on rules and routines. Certainly 
the nuances of routines have been well debated in the literature (see for example, Becker, 
2008; Pentland, 2011; Pentland et al. 2012; Quinn, 2014, 2011; van der Steen, 2011). 
However, the nature of rules has received less attention, at least in the management 
accounting literature (but in the broader literature see, for example, the works of Hodgson, 
2006, 1997 and Wittgenstein, 1953).  
We draw on an alternative, wider conception of rules, not restricted to ‘formal’ rules. 
Formal rules remain, of course, included in the concept, but we add two other dimensions. 
The first conceptual addition is considering rules as internal cognitive structures, within 
the agent, i.e., accepted rules influencing actors’ perceptions and practices (Coad and 
Herbert, 2009). Additionally, there have been recent reminders of the importance of 
technology in the practices and routines of contemporary organizations (Pentland, 2011). 
We therefore also draw on a socio-material perspective to explicitly incorporate non-
human entities (in particular, software) alongside human beings (individual and 
collective), and to analyse the role of this technology on the interactions between rules, 
routines and practices. This allows us to consider a third, material realm of rules, of rules 
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as embedded in technological devices such as software. These alternative 
conceptualizations of rules proved effective in explaining change processes in the 
Oliveira (2010) study, and this paper draws on them to support the proposed framework 
on the interactions between rules and routines.  
Specifically, we propose an OIE framework which 1) rethinks the nature of rules, 2) 
unpacks the interactions between rules and routines, and 3) includes the role of 
technology. We propose that it is necessary to look at and understand rules and routines 
as separate (but linked) phenomena. We hope the framework insights promote clearer 
understanding of the complex nature of change in and around management accounting 
and that practitioners will be better equipped to actually achieve change in practice. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section Two reviews the extant literature 
on routines and rules, including both limitations and advances, to set the groundwork for 
our later arguments. Section Three briefly introduces and compares our two respective 
cases, to highlight why the two authors were separately led to focus on either routines or 
rules as being more important for each organizational change initiative. Section Four 
offers and discusses an enhanced framework on the interactions between rules and 
routines and Section Five draws on our case studies to provide two ex-post examples of 
our framework in action in a management accounting setting. Section Six concludes with 
some final remarks and suggestions for further research.  
2. Issues and advances on rules and routines 
This section reviews extant literature on rules and routines. We begin by focusing on rules 
and routines in the OIE strand of institutional theory (Moll et al., 2006) and then introduce 
alternative perspectives on these concepts. Finally, we explore the interactions of rules 
and routines, and the role that non-human, technological actors such as information 
systems can play. 
Rules and routines in Old-Institutional Economics 
In management accounting, research at the organizational level drawing on OIE and 
paying close attention to rules and routines includes the seminal work of Burns and 
Scapens (2000) (hereafter B&S), Lukka (2007) and van der Steen (2011). Briefly, and 
drawing particularly on B&S, institutions are typically defined as taken for granted 
assumptions, routines as “the way things are done” (2000, p. 5) and rules as “the ways 
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things should be done” (2000, p. 6) according to formal statements. Management 
accounting is typically seen as a “routine and potentially institutionalized organisational 
practice” (B&S, 2000, p. 5), generally portraying some consistency over time.  
It has been pointed out that a strength of OIE (like other strands of institutional theory – 
see Moll et al., 2006) lies in explaining how social structures like institutions, routines 
and rules constrain practices. OIE has extensively explored the ‘reconstitutive downward 
effect’I in which institutions influence “individual habits of thought and action” 
(Hodgson, 2006, p. 7) – a downward effect also broadly applicable to the ways in which 
the two other structures, rules and routines, influence practices. However, OIE has 
arguably been less successful in explaining the emergence of these structures (see 
Hodgson, 1989), with founders of institutional theory calling for clearer understanding of 
the micro foundations of macro structures (DiMaggio, 1997; Barley, 2008)II. In the 
literature, some concepts and relationships have been questioned or considered to be not 
sufficiently clear, such as routines and the relationships between rules and routines. We 
now explore advances in the literature and integrate ideas which have not been adequately 
related, to set the ground for our framework in Section Four. 
Conceptualizations of routines: multiple dimensions  
Scholars from outside the management accounting area have recognized a duality of 
routines. Winter (1995, pp. 169-170) distinguishes a “routine per se - the abstract activity 
pattern” and a “routine in operation at a particular site”. Similarly, Feldman and Pentland 
(2003) state that organisational routines have two dimensions, namely the ostensive and 
performative. The ostensive dimension “may have a significant tacit component” which 
moulds the perception of the routine, “may exist as a taken-for-granted norm” (Feldman 
and Pentland, 2003, p. 101) and represents “abstract, cognitive regularities and 
expectations that enable participants to guide, account for and refer to specific 
performances of a routine” (Pentland and Feldman, 2008, p. 286). The ostensive 
dimension is thus subjective, since it “incorporates the subjective understandings of 
diverse participants” (Feldman and Pentland, 2003, p. 101). The performative dimension 
refers to “the specific action(s) taken by people […] when engaged in an organisational 
routine” (Feldman and Pentland, 2003, p. 102) “at specific times, in specific places” 
(Pentland and Feldman, 2008, p. 286). Thus, Feldman and Pentland (2003) distinguish 
between the abstract concept of a routine per se and the associated behaviour (see also 
Pentland and Feldman, 2008; Hodgson, 2008, 2006).  
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This dual dimension of routines as structure and as action is absent from management 
accounting frameworks like B&S. Englund and Gerdin (2008) refer to conceptual 
disparity, where some writers view management accounting as modalities (structures) 
drawn on to reproduce practices, whereas others view management accounting as 
recurrent practices (actions)III. They argue that combining both conceptualizations may 
be ontologically problematic due to conflating social structure and action, and that 
“[…] we need notions both to describe the situated and recurrent management 
accounting practices as such, and to denote the non-situated modalities that inform 
those management accounting practices” (Englund and Gerdin, 2008, p. 1130). 
 
We adopt the notion of duality in management accounting routines to avoid conceptual 
disparity (Burns, 2009; Englund and Gerdin, 2008; Johannson and Siverbo, 2009) and 
clearly distinguish between the tacit (ostensive) dimension and the action (performative) 
dimension of routines (Feldman and Pentland, 2003). This distinction is particularly 
useful when rules are apparently absent (see the RoutineCo case later): in the absence of 
(formal) rules, the ostensive dimension would operate as orienting actors’ practices at a 
collective level.  
Repetition is a core characteristic of routines (Becker, 2004), but we argue that a 
performative routine is ‘more’ than a merely repeated practice. The fact that a practice is 
repeated (e.g., once) is unlikely to be sufficient to allow considering it as a performative 
routine. Since there are empirical difficulties for researchers to recognize a routine when 
they encounter one, we suggest some distinctive characteristics, which refer to less visible 
characteristics. Characteristics like inertia (Becker, 2004; van der Steen, 2009), 
automaticity and tacitness (Lorenz, 2000) are required to classify a repeated practice as a 
routine. Inertia refers to rigidity (Gilbert, 2005) and how routines preserve the underlying 
logic, creating a reinforcing cycle supporting the routine and manifested through limited 
change in behaviour (van der Steen, 2009). Inertia of routines is thus similar to inertia of 
physical objects, resisting change to its state of: 1) rest, since a routine does not get 
constituted immediately; and 2) motion, since a routine tends to remain stable in time - 
although performative routines can fade away over time if not enacted (Feldman and 
Pentland, 2003; Pentland and Feldman, 2008). Inertial tendency to remain in motion is 
strongly influenced by some automaticity in performative routines. Automaticity refers 
to the ability to undertake tasks in an almost unconscious fashion. Finally, tacitness 
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implies an unspoken and inferred way of doing things. Together, characteristics such as 
inertia, automaticity and tacitness have a sedimentary effect (Clegg, 1989; Cooper et al., 
1996; Hyndman et al., 2012; Malhotra and Hinings, 2005), whereby repeated practices 
gradually evolve into a ‘settled’ routine. 
In addition to the ostensive and performative dimensions of routines, more recent 
literature has added another interesting dimension of routines. Volkoff et al. (2007) refer 
to a material dimension of routines, embedded within software and which is “concrete 
and specific” as opposed to “idealized and abstract” (p. 840). They note that the material 
dimension is not the same as a performative dimension, as the system/software executes 
a transaction, rather than performs it. We will return to this dimension later as we explore 
rules and develop our framework 
The above institutional literature typically pays relatively little attention to rules (Englund 
and Gerdin, 2008; Johansson and Siverbo, 2009; Quinn, 2011; van der Steen 2011, 2009) 
and, as stated, tends to conceptualize rules as formal. For example, Feldman and Pentland 
(2003) and Pentland and Feldman (2008) describe (formal) rules as artefacts of routines, 
implying that routines would tend to exist before (formal) rules. However, we now 
suggest an alternative conceptualization of rules. 
 
Conceptualizations of rules: beyond formal rules 
The narrow conceptualization of rules as formal rules has arguably stifled advance. As 
Hodgson (2006) notes, there is no consensus on what “formal” means, since it has been 
differently associated with notions such as “legal, written, explicit, codifiable” (p. 18). In 
addition, the contextualization and operationalization of formal rules always depends on 
non-legal rules and inexplicit norms and, importantly, there is no clear distinction 
between formal and informal. Moreover, the defence for this narrow definition is often 
largely conventional: an option by the researcher to thus define them, or simply following 
a definition in the literature. In some cases, the argument is to clearly distinguish rules 
from routines: (formal) rules have a documented nature, whereas routines do not (Quinn, 
2014). However, key institutionalists such as DiMaggio (1997), Barley (2008) and 
Thornton and Ocasio (2008) use the term ‘rule’ beyond the restricted notion of formal 
rules (although typically without an explicit definition), seemingly aware that a restricted 
conceptualization is not necessary, is not useful and is actually counter-intuitive.  
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We propose a broad notion of rules, in line with a general sense understanding of the 
term, unrestricted by conventional academic definitions. The notion of “prevailing rules 
of practice” goes beyond formal/informal dimensions. “Formal” rules remain included, 
but the emphasis is on rules as “internal structures, within the agent” (Coad and Herbert 
2009, p. 179) (see also, Busco, 2009), as accepted, perceived and later enacted by 
organizational actors. These internal structures are cognitive representations, “connected 
sets of precepts” (Englund and Gerdin, 2008 p. 1129), and they “embed themselves within 
people’s minds and cognitive armoury” (as used by Burns, 2009, p. 18 to characterize 
“habits, routines and other rule-like structures”). Clegg (1989) identifies rules of meaning 
(ways of making sense of the world) and rules of membership (beliefs of appropriate 
behaviour given actual or desired membership of certain groups). These two types of 
rules, analytically separated but which in practice are interrelated, orient agents on how 
to perceive the world and act, hence creating behavioural dispositions. In a nutshell, the 
focus and the distinctiveness of this alternative notion of rule is on becoming a rule to a 
particular agent, within and accepted by him/her. 
Hodgson (2006, p. 3) suggests a rule “is broadly understood as a socially transmitted and 
customary normative injunction or immanently normative disposition, that in 
circumstances X do Y”. In line with the ‘reconstitutive downward effect’ discussed 
above, prevailing, accepted rules are subsequently enacted in actors’ and organizational 
practices. Again, the crucial point is becoming a rule (as an internal structure) to 
particular actors - rather than being externally defined or proposed, in whatever form, 
but without having become accepted. “If laws or declarations are neither customary nor 
embodied in individual dispositions, then ‘formal’ or not they have insignificant effects. 
They are mere declarations or proclamations, rather than effective social rules” (Hodgson, 
2006, p. 18).  
Highlighting rules acceptance and enactment by particular actors requires considering the 
inherent indexicality of rules (Clegg, 1989). Indexicality refers to how “rules are 
dependent on the context in which they are drawn upon by agents”. This context 
dependency is related with two processes of interpretation: regarding the context of 
interpreters (i.e., the organisational members); and regarding the context of interpretation 
(i.e., the actual situation in which the rule is interpreted and potentially enacted) (Oliveira, 
2010, p. 160). Interpretation is often ambiguous (Boland, 1996), but a first (and then 
repeated) enactment of a rule in particular circumstances may increase clarity and reduce 
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uncertainty around it. Although contexts may change, performing these two types of 
interpretation promotes the emergence of ‘jurisprudence’ for future interpretation (and 
enactment) of the rule by those actors, thus potentially further strengthening the rule as 
an orienting, cognitive structure and making it more resilient. At the same time, but in the 
opposing direction, interpreting and enacting rules in particular circumstances creates an 
opportunity to clarify and even change those accepted rules. When attempting to enact a 
rule, actors may be confronted with limitations of how it is defined or how it should be 
applied – a difficulty that may question the validity of the rule and trigger a process of 
redefinition and reinterpretation.  
 
The relevance of rules as internal cognitive structures remains even considering the 
Carnegie School’s (see Hodgson, 1988) insights that behaviour is not entirely 
deliberative, conscious and intentional, and that individuals adopt satisficing (rather than 
maximizing) strategies (March and Simon, 1958). These findings emphasize rule 
following and, particularly, routinized rule following - even if mere ‘rules of thumb’ are 
involved (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Hodgson, 2008; Scapens, 1994). But routinized 
rule following still begs the issue of knowing what the followed rules are and highlights 
that there are still rules involved – albeit potentially not formal ones. Indeed, Becker 
(1998) adopts this concept of rule as a cognitive representation to replace the abstract 
level of routines. Furthermore, DiMaggio (1997) states that while the most important type 
of cognition is automatic (routine and schematic), deliberative cognition remains relevant 
in the less frequent (but potentially more crucial and valuable) occasions of critical 
reflection, where accepted rules are consensually central.IV  
 
In brief, an expanded conception of rules encompasses the notion of formal rules but adds 
and places a distinctive emphasis on rules as an internal, cognitive structure of agents - 
rules as accepted and which may then be enacted by agents. This wider notion makes a 
case for rules to regain a centre stage in institutional research, next to routines, and 
addresses calls from various approaches to consider cognitive insights in sociological 
accounts. Some calls are indirect, as in Giddens’ (1984) reminders about the potential of 
reflexive and knowledgeable agency at a micro level (Englund et al., 2011); but others 
are more direct, as in DiMaggio’s (1997), Barley’s (2008) and Thornton and Ocasio’s 
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(2008) call to use the “psychology of mental structures” to capture the “micro 
foundational evidence for the efficacy of agency” (DiMaggio, 1997, p. 271) through 
rational, mindful behaviour, particularly at relatively low social levels such as 
organizations. 
 
Reflections on rules and routines – and non-human actors  
Having explored extant literature on rules and routines, we now explore their interactions, 
building on the previous discussion and also including non-human actors such as 
information systems – key actors underpinning routines in contemporary organizations 
(Pentland, 2011). 
Rules underlying routines 
Rules, as conceptualized above, are implicated in all dimensions of routines in recent 
literature, whether routines are conceived as having ostensive, performative and/or 
material dimensions. First, the ostensive dimension of routines refers to its guiding 
properties, which we have located in agents’ internal structures; as Quinn (2010, p. 295) 
noted, “[i]t could be argued that the ostensive aspect of a routine is similar to an informal 
(undocumented) rule”. We have also included in this ostensive dimension the dispositions 
that routines generate within agents towards acting in certain ways; discussing this 
dispositional dimension, Johansson and Siverbo (2009) highlight that “routines can be 
expressed as rules” (p. 148). Second, in the performative dimension of routines as 
programmatic rule-based behaviours, the underlying rule being enacted (albeit in a 
routinized way) should not be ignored. Third, Volkoff et al.’s (2007) discussion on the 
material dimension of routines actually concerns the multiple rules underlying routines 
being hard-coded in information technology. Although Volkoff et al. do not mention 
rules, their definition of material routines as “embedded in the ES [Enterprise System] in 
the form of system-executed transactions - sets of explicitly defined steps that require 
specific data inputs to automatically generate specific outcomes” (p. 839) actually refers 
to rules defining transactions and their sequence, based on the application of the coded 
rules to the particular circumstances that occur in everyday organizational life. 
It is therefore impossible to expunge rules out of the debate on routines, routinized rule 
following and routinized action. For example, routinely producing a monthly variance 
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statement is the enactment of an accepted rule stating that such a report should be 
produced every month – even if potentially an almost unconscious rule.  
Rules without, and before, routines 
Not only rules underlie routines, as argued above, but rules may influence behaviour even 
when there are no routines – a scenario which further increases the importance of rules to 
understand organizational practices. In a given empirical setting, routines may not exist 
due to lack of previous occurrence, recurrence or merely insufficient recurrence, failing 
to reach a routinization threshold. In other words: recurrence is necessary, but not 
sufficient, for routines to existV; however, this requirement does not apply to rules, which 
may have been accepted by actors and thus orient practices in that empirical setting, 
without those actions ever having been performed by those actors. 
As we already stated, recurrence, or repetition, is a basic characteristic of routines. “The 
only commonality amongst [the various definitions of routines] is that they have to do 
something with repetition or regularity” (Becker, 2004, p. 664; see also Quinn, 2011; 
Pentland, 2011). Recurrence of behaviours is required both to create a routine and to 
maintain it (Feldman and Pentland, 2003). Realistically, “one would be hard pressed to 
call something happening only once a routine” (Becker, 2004, p. 646). Moreover, 
“without on-going performance”, the performative dimension disappears and even the 
ostensive dimension, though it may still exist, “becomes meaningless” (Feldman and 
Pentland, 2003, p. 108) and “may diminish over time, or even disappear” (Quinn, 2010, 
p. 296).  
Furthermore, recurrence does not guarantee the achievement of routine status, neither in 
the ostensive dimension, nor in the performative dimension. There may be recurrence, 
but not sufficient recurrence to become a routine - at least, not yet. Clearly, the level of 
sufficient recurrence is not definable in quantitative terms. Repetition is inherently a time-
related concept – but most likely in a non-linear way (Quattrone and Hopper, 2005). For 
example, a new once-a-year management accounting task might not be regarded as 
routine for a number of years, whereas a task performed multiple times per month may 
be considered a routine in a much shorter timeframe. In addition, the extent to which a 
practice is repeated throughout a company may promote such a practice to routine status 
more quickly. So, the degree of repetition required for a routine to emerge may involve 
13 
 
dimensions such as the length, quantity, intensity or organizational spread of the 
repetition - but it is unlikely to be definable in quantitative, general terms.  
We acknowledge that Burns (2000) warns about not exaggerating the potential of 
routinization: “Routines (…) comprise ‘programmatic’, rules-based behaviour (…) 
grounded in repeatedly following such rules. (…) The above is not to say, however, that 
all accounting becomes routinized (…), but that there is potential for routinization” 
(Burns, 2000, p. 571; see also Yazdifar et al., 2008). So, the necessary (but insufficient) 
requirement of recurrence restricts the field of application of the routine concept, and 
researchers should be cautious about claiming that a given routine does exist in a certain 
empirical setting.  
On the contrary, rules do not require repeated occurrence of behaviours. Actors may draw 
on specific rules for reasons unrelated with existing routines. A Parsonian perspective 
(which largely underlies OIE’s mechanism of institutions downward effects) emphasizes 
morally accepted rules, the individuals’ evaluative judgment based on wider values, 
norms and attitudes derived from socialization. Alternatively, a more calculative 
perspective highlights that individuals may enact certain rules according to strategic 
purposes, rather than genuine internalization and moral acceptance (Boland, 1996; 
Ribeiro, 2003; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). None of these perspectives is crucially 
dependent on previous behaviour. 
It is plausible, as B&S suggest, that repeated behaviours may create (ostensive) routines 
- which may be conceptualized as rules – and then eventually even be codified as (formal) 
rules (see also Quinn, 2011). We accept that past and, particularly, recurrent behaviour 
may leave its mark on actors and their rules, as highlighted by the notion of path-
dependency (e.g., Becker, 2004; Burns, 2000; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Coad and 
Cullen, 2006; Coad and Herbert, 2009; Modell et al., 2007; Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Powell, 1991; Spraakman, 2006). However, our point, as already stated, is that rules, 
unlike routines, do not derive necessarily from past behaviour; rules may exist (as formal 
rules and/or as part of an individual’s internal structure) without any underlying 
prescribed action having ever been performed. 
The above arguments open the possibility that rules may precede routines – a sequence 
different from the usual rationale in the literature, in which extant routines underlie the 
creation of (formal) rules (e.g., Burns and Scapens, 2000; Quinn, 2011). Rules, as part of 
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actors’ internal cognitive structures, influence perceptions and actions. As noted above, 
rules enactment in particular circumstances requires considering rules indexicality; and 
the required processes of interpretation (of the context of the interpreters and of the 
context of interpretation) and the emergent jurisprudence may further strengthen the rule 
as a cognitive structure, thus making those rules more resilient. As Modell et al. (2007) 
note, B&S mainly ascribe resilience (e.g., of controls) to routines. We agree, but we are 
providing a more detailed account of underlying processes, by relating that resilience of 
routines to the resilience of underlying rules, gained through their (initial and repeated) 
interpretation and enactment in particular circumstances.  Upon recurrent enactment of 
those rules, these repeated practices may become routinized (and, eventually, 
institutionalized). In this scenario, rules underlie the emergence of, and therefore precede, 
routines – an alternative sequence which may be a useful additional explanatory insight 
for researchers. 
 
Rules, routines and non-human actors 
Pentland (2011) reminds us that non-human actors such as information systems may play 
a significant part in today’s organizational practices, including routines. The explicit 
consideration of non-human actors, ranging from non-human living entities to 
technological devices, alongside individual and collective human actors, is a landmark of 
Actor-Network Theory (ANT) (Callon, 1986). Volkoff et al. (2007) draw on critical 
realism (Archer, 1995) to highlight information technology as a particularly relevant 
artefact in organizational routines, since “it is an integral part of those routines, not just 
part of the context within which routines are executed” (Volkoff et al., 2007, p. 833). On 
the contrary, institutional theory has tended to focus on human actors, at an individual 
and (in particular) at a collective level; non-human entities are not usually considered as 
actors, but typically seen as contextual factors.  
As described by Andon et al. (2007, p. 276), “ANT explores processes and relational 
effects within socio-technical networks of elements”, i.e., socio-technical relations. 
Pentland (2011) recently added to his prolific writings on routines the ANT view of 
‘socio-materiality’ to describe how organizational practices are inevitably bound with 
materiality. Volkoff et al.’s (2007) critical realist view on the material dimension of 
routines – or the material dimension of rules, as we reframed it above – emphasizes 
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technology even more than ANT, and clearly separates structure and agency. Indeed, a 
particular appeal of the material dimension of information systems is their potential to 
operate as a simultaneously constraining and enabling device, routing organizational 
actions. We share Volkoff et al.’s view that although technology is interpretively flexible 
(Orlikowski, 2000, 1992), it is not infinitely flexible. Following Volkoff et al., we 
consider that viewing technology as “interpretively flexible (Orlikowski 1992, p. 405), 
enacted and defined at the moment of use” (p. 834), may underestimate the rigidities 
imposed upon users during their everyday activities. We concur with ANT that an 
information system is actually a socio-material entity, defined within a socio-material 
actor-network (including, for example, the human actors and the available information 
technology within and around an organization). However, as everyday organizational life 
unfolds through the interactions of human and non-human actors, such material device 
operates in a rather inflexible way, according to the options available and selected at its 
configuration stage.  
Although this is not a new characteristic of today’s world, it may be argued that the role 
of technology in organizations is now more prevalent and pervading than ever. As such, 
institutional theory explanations (about institutions, routines, rules and practices) may be 
enriched by explicitly incorporating non-human entities, and technology in particular and 
information systems above all, as a particular and increasingly important category of 
actors.  
 
Summary of rules and routines 
In this section, we suggested replacing the more common, narrow conception of rules as 
formal rules, by a wider, yet micro level one, that also includes rules as actors’ internal 
structures. This may bolster the explanatory power of micro foundations leading to the 
emergence of routines and, ultimately, institutionalized practices at the collective level. 
The current literature emphasis on routines may leave researchers with an inadequate 
conceptual toolkit to account for empirical situations in which actors’ cognitive structures 
orient their actions, but in which routines have not (yet) consolidated. Extant institutional 
frameworks neglect the insight that routines may not emerge at all and surely do not 
emerge immediately after an action is first performed. In addition, we noted the relevance 
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of technology, and information systems in particular, in today’s organisational practices 
(and rules and routines). 
In Section Four, we present a framework which addresses these gaps and helps 
researchers identify characteristics which distinguish rules, routines and merely repeated 
practices - and explicitly incorporates technologically embedded rules. First, in Section 
Three, we briefly recount our empirical cases to highlight similarities, but also differences 
which guided us in separate directions in the use of the concepts of rules and routines. 
3. Empirical insights from RuleCo and RoutineCo 
As noted earlier, we both studied management accounting change using case studies 
involving organisational change and information systems. Our cases are termed RuleCo 
(Oliveira, 2010) and RoutineCo (Quinn, 2010). We now briefly summarize the change 
processes of the cases drawing on three key dimensions of change: context, substance and 
politics (Dawson, 2003). Context refers to the past and present setting within which 
change occurs. Substance refers to four sub-dimensions, namely: (1) scale and scope of 
the change; (2) defining characteristics of change; (3) timeframe; and (4) the perceived 
centrality of change. Politics are activities to gain power within and around the 
organization. In this paper, we see power as a capacity to achieve objectives and attain 
interests (Clegg, 1989). Politics may include “government pressures, head-office or 
parent-company influence, trade union activity, influence of consultants and relationships 
between management and operations staff” (Dawson, 2003, p. 8).  
RuleCo 
RuleCo is a large European manufacturing company which grew mainly through 
acquisitions, leading to a dispersed organizational structure across three continents. The 
empirical case work occurred between 2005 and 2008, with the analysis period being 
1998-2008.  
By the end of the 1990’s, a multiplicity of non-standard business processes existed across 
countries and plants and many local plant managers exercised more power than expected, 
given their formally defined relations with theoretically ‘powerful’ central actors – 
including RuleCo’s main shareholder. The integration process of a very large competitor 
acquired by RuleCo was in its early stages and competitive pressures were strong. Finally, 
its accounting systems were disparate and not year 2000 compliant. In this context, the 
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company initiated a large scale change project in 1998. The substance of the change 
project included the implementation of SAP financial modules and the introduction of a 
new corporate centre and a shared-services centre, in the same location of the main 
shareholder. The change project thus involved large-scale change in business processes, 
organizational structures and information systems. 
Clashes of interests, power struggles and resistance characterized a high-pressured 
change project. The network of the three innovations (the two new organizational 
structures and the SAP information system) were decisive to re-balance power relations 
in favour of the main shareholder and other central actors. RuleCo’s redefined network 
allowed conducting redefined financial business processes based on SAP through the 
shared service centre, reallocating tasks from local actors to central actors and 
establishing more or less subtle – yet effective – incentives to promote the enactment of 
centrally-defined rules. Together, these changes strongly contributed to standardized and 
centrally controlled rules, both in the accounting area and beyond, becoming accepted 
and enacted across RuleCo.  
RoutineCo 
RoutineCo, like RuleCo, is a large European manufacturing company that grew over time, 
mainly through acquisitions in Central and Eastern Europe. These acquisitions resulted 
in a dispersed and decentralized organisation and multiple, non-standardized business 
practices. The empirical case work occurred between 2005 and 2008, with the analysis 
period being 2004-2008. 
RoutineCo had implemented SAP in 1998 for core finance processes, but product costing 
and production planning remained outside SAP. Spreadsheets were used for product 
costing, and the level of product costing was not detailed. Externally, RoutineCo faced 
increased economic and competitive pressures. Combined with the dispersed nature of 
the organisation, these pressures brought about a large scale information systems change 
project – which included management accounting. The project started in 2004 and the 
substance of the change included new product costing systems and standardized business 
processes around product costing. 
RuleCo vs. RoutineCo 
Although our methodological approach here is not comparative case studies, many 
similarities between the two cases stand out. Both companies operated in process 
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industries with several similar traits and were affected by similar global economic factors. 
Both cases involved organisational and information systems change with an impact 
(direct or indirect) on management accounting. Both aimed at achieving some degree of 
common centralized information systems, through which new technology would 
incorporate new ways of doing things in accounting and other organisational areas. Table 
1 summarizes key aspects of the change process in the two organisations. The key 
difference in how change was to be brought about was the impetus and formality with 
which the change was to be made. In particular, and importantly for our argument, the 
difference was whether rules (and other organisational features) were deliberately used to 
change practices (in RuleCo), or whether practices changed in an emergent and largely 
undirected process (in RoutineCo). 
Key aspects of 
change processes 
RuleCo RoutineCo 
Time frame  Major events in 1998-2004, and on-
going throughout the field work (2005-
2008) 
 2004-2008 
Scope of change  Financial area  Production planning & product 
costing; also sales function 
Scale of change  Scale: Large scale & radical;  
o Large IS change 
o Large changes in business processes 
 Large changes in organizational 
structures 
 Scale: Large scale & discreet 
o Discreet IS change 




 New IS (SAP FI & Document 
management solution) 
 New organizational structures 
o Relocation of Corporate Centre 
(CC) 
o New Shared Services Centre (SSC) 
 New, standardized business processes 
in financial area 
 New production planning & 
product costing systems 
 Standardized business 
processes in sales, planning 
and product costing 
 
Table 1: Key aspects of change processes in RuleCo and RoutineCo. 
At RuleCo, rules were the key focus of the change. The change process at RuleCo 
included two salient features: first, a vigorous attempt to change accepted rules of human 
actors at the subsidiary level; second, embedding rules within new information systems. 
On the other hand, at RoutineCo, even though changes were made, they were more 
informal, involved no obvious clashes of interest and were more emergent in nature. 
Although in both cases change was an on-going process (Dawson, 2003), RuleCo depicts 
a more classical change scenario (Lewin, 1951) in that there is an almost apparent 
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‘starting point’ when actors deliberately intend to introduce new rules to attain particular 
objectives and interests.  
To elaborate briefly, at RuleCo, key central actors perceived local actors had too much 
power – an issue which the central actors wished to re-balance to their favour. They 
created new organisational structures, attempted to change the extant rules that local 
actors accepted and enacted in their everyday life and, whenever possible, embedded 
desired rules within new information systems. At RuleCo, there were explicit and 
purposeful attempts to introduce rules in a reconfigured organisational network, aiming 
to reshape practices (by both human and non-human actors) in clearly defined ways, so 
that interests of central actors were attained. Section Five provides three examples on 
management accounting and control – in particular, about controls on purchasing and 
credit risk decisions and about product costing requirements. The three examples show 
how attempts to change practices were targeted at changing prevalent rules and created 
mechanisms promoting their enactment, through both self-discipline and traditional (but 
organisationally-embedded) control devices. Ultimately, this change process re-balanced 
power more towards the centre of the organization.  
In contrast, at RoutineCo, although the changes were seen as central to survival and 
supported by top management, no formal procedures were created, adopted or forced 
upon any actors - in the management accounting realm at least. In fact, in contrast to 
RuleCo, changes made to systems and processes only gradually emerged and evolved as 
the change project was rolled out. They were not initially embedded within software by 
any actor as the way things should be done. Section Five provides an example of change 
to cost reporting which highlights the emerging, evolving and less formal nature of 
change at RoutineCo. Overall, in RoutineCo routines gradually emerged out of practices 
without being explicitly driven or desired, whereas in RuleCo actors were not willing to 
wait for routines to emerge and carried out purposeful interventions to influence practices, 
which included addressing, head-on, prevalent rules of practice.  
Reflecting on our objective in this paper, the cases highlight that, in order to understand 
practices and organizational change, rules may be a more or less important explanatory 
variable than routines, at least if we view rules in a formal sense. The decisiveness of the 
change process at RuleCo required changing prevalent rules - changes in actors’ internal 
cognitive structures and in adopted information systems aiming to directly impact 
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practices. Routines were not addressed directly, but they were expected to emerge as a 
consequence of the repetition of rule-based practices. The question now is what this 
implies for management accounting research drawing on institutional theory, in particular 
research focusing on routines. As we noted earlier, unpacking rules and routines may help 
gaining a clearer understanding of their interactions and hence improve our 
interpretations of management accounting change.  
4. A framework on interactions of rules and routines. 
Based primarily on a synthesis of the literature, spurred on and guided by our cases, and 
developed through further theoretical elaboration, we propose a framework, in the 
technology-driven functioning of contemporary organisations, which explores the 
interactions of management accounting rules and routines in more detail than extant 
institutional literature, to improve our interpretations of management accounting change. 
We first introduce and describe the framework, then note some clarifications and points 
of discussion. In Section Five, we apply it to examples from our cases. 
The framework 
As stated in the introduction, each author of the present paper independently conducted 
each case study, RuleCo (Oliveira, 2010) and RoutineCo (Quinn, 2010). However, only 
subsequent discussions about our cases, interpretations and developments allowed us to 
gradually identify similarities, differences and complementarities, at both empirical and 
theoretical levels. Ongoing discussions led us to jointly (re)interpret our cases and further 
explore the literature, culminating in a framework which allows making sense of our cases 
and is presented in this section. The framework is later applied in Section Five, not only 
to reveal the kind of empiric examples and interpretations which underpinned the 
framework development, but also to illustrate how the model can be applied within the 
management accounting and control area.  
Our brief case analysis clearly shows that rules and routines are separable phenomena. 
So, to better understand and interpret the nature of change in a real-life management 
accounting setting, a researcher may wish to concentrate the analysis of change on either 
rules or routines, depending on the case characteristics. This is not to say that rules and 
routines must be solely determined as separable phenomena. We entirely agree with the 
view that rules and routines interact to bring about potentially institutionalized, taken-for-
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granted management accounting practices. However, and particularly because we agree 
with this, we re-visited the two concepts (and specifically the relatively neglected concept 
of rules) and how they interact. Our point is that rules may be more or less important than 
routines in different cases, that rules may precede the emergence of routines, and that 
technological factors like information systems may be crucial to understand practices, 
rules and routines.  
Recent contributions on the nature of rules and routines also suggest a re-visit of extant 
institutional frameworks. Quinn (2014, 2011) contributed to this re-visit by concentrating 
on routines. Drawing particularly on developments about the nature of rules, we propose 
in Figure 1 a framework on interactions between rules and routines across multiple 
dimensions. The framework broadly mirrors that of B&S, but it takes into account earlier 
discussions, namely: 1) the separable nature of rules and routines; 2) the definition of 
routines in multiple dimensions; 3) the widened definition of rules, in multiple 
dimensions; and 4) the role of technology.  
[insert Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1 – A framework on the interactions of rules and routines. 
 
The framework depicts three realms – material, action and psychological – which 
encompass the ontology of the elements which we argue ultimately lead to 
institutionalized management accounting practices. The material realm encompasses 
technologically embedded rules, encoded within technological devices such as ERP 
systems software and other similar technologies. The action realm encompasses the actual 
performance of management accounting practices by actors. The psychological realm 
encompasses cognitive understandings, including how practices are to be performed. 
Consistent with the above downplay of the distinction between formal and informal rules, 
the framework does not depict formal rules for simplification purposesVI. Considering all 
three realms helps interpret how management accounting practices may or may not 
become routinized.  
The psychological realm includes internal cognitive structures, i.e., rules which have been 
accepted by organisational membersVII. In the material realm, accounting software 
typically includes encoded rules, as described by Oliveira (2010) and Volkoff et al. 
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(2007). These encoded rules have been selected by organisational members driving the 
software implementation, according to the rules they accept and consider desirableVIII. 
Together, cognitive and material rules are structures which inform ‘new’ practices, 
performed within a particular socio-technical network. Most organisational practices are 
repeatedly performed (supported by technologically embedded rules), and may eventually 
gain a routinized nature. This routinized nature encompasses performative routines 
(actions) and ostensive routines (Feldman and Pentland, 2003), with the latter 
representing a rule reinforced by routinization. Ultimately, if both routine dimensions are 
sustained in time, they may develop a taken-for-granted status within the organization 
and become institutionalized.  
Our framework also includes the interdependence between the performative and the 
ostensive dimensions of routines (cf. Feldman and Pentland, 2003). The acting out of the 
routine (the performative routine) is essential for the ostensive dimension to emerge and 
be sustained. In time, without action, routines may become meaningless, diminish and 
even dissipate (although “dormant” routines can be re-enacted; see Birnholtz et al., 2007). 
In turn, an ostensive routine is a rule providing guidance for action, representing a 
propensity to act (Burns, 2009; Hodgson, 2008). In fact, it is a rule enacted over and over 
again, becoming an empirically tried and tested idea of a routine, having gone through 
the processes of context interpretation involved in rules enactment (which, as we have 
argued, may reinforce the rule). So, an ostensive routine is a rule that has achieved a 
routine nature, an empirically strengthened rule, and hence in turn will influence practices 
even more strongly than before the rule evolved and became embedded in a routine.  
The core of the framework depicts a scenario where institutionalized practices are 
(potentially) formed, in a bottom-up approach. In the opposite direction, institutions 
underlie the downward causality described by OIE. This bi-directional dynamism is 
represented by the circular arrow around the framework, conveying its holistic, 
synchronic and diachronic nature. The analogy of sedimentation (Clegg, 1989; Cooper et 
al., 1996; Hyndman et al., 2012; Malhotra and Hinings, 2005) noted earlier is particularly 
appropriate in the diachronic sense, as ‘layers’ of existing institutional practices combine 
with new emerging practices and routines over time to bring about change in a cumulative 
emergent fashion. Finally, the inward-facing arrows around the framework reflect that all 
elements can potentially change based on contextual factors and external forces - such as 
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technological change, economic shocks, legislation, external consultants, new entrants 
into the organization and so forth.  
Framework clarifications and consequences 
The framework starts with the assumption that rules have been accepted by organization 
members, but we do not examine how this acceptance of rules occurs. Also, we do not 
elaborate whether cognitive rules are derived from formal or informal rules (Hodgson, 
2006), or whether they have a constitutive or regulative nature (Searle, 2005), as such 
notions do not detract from the fact that cognitive rules have been accepted by 
organisational members.  
Second, we are not suggesting that the depicted process will necessarily unfold. For 
example, as already mentioned, a repeated practice may not become a routine, or it may 
not be possible to embed accepted rules into technological devices. Frequently, the 
generic rules available in technologies such as ERP systems software may not match 
organizational requirements and customization may not be appropriate.  
Third, we depict institutionalized practices as being underpinned by action and 
psychological realms, but not the material realm. Although research highlighted the 
importance of material conditions (e.g., software) and technologically embedded rules in 
management accounting practices (e.g., Dechow et al, 2007), they are not an essential 
component of routines per se and, inherently, of institutionalized practices – hence the 
dotted lines in the frameworkIX.  
Finally, we acknowledge we are not addressing the long standing debate between agency 
and structure (see for example Hodgson, 1989). Our framework focuses specifically on 
the interaction between two structures (rules and routines), in which action plays a central 
role. Specifically, action mediates rules and routines, as enactment of cognitively 
accepted and/or technologically embedded rules and as a required precursor of routines. 
Having acknowledged our limited engagement with the structure/agency, stability/change 
debate, the previous discussion addressed two ways in which change can occur. First, 
rules (as cognitive structures and as technologically embedded rules) seem to be easier to 
influence in a direct, purposeful manner, when compared to routines. As stated, routines 
tend to emerge gradually, becoming sedimented based on repetition and increased 
acceptance (ostensive routines as ‘empirically strengthened rules’), often beyond direct 
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managerial influence. Second, rules indexicality (see above) opens up a way to rules 
reinterpretation and adaptation as they are drawn upon and enacted by actors in their daily 
lives. This promotes the possibility of actor-driven change in the very structure we started 
with - the rule as accepted and interpreted by organizational members - as it encounters 
the ‘real life’ context in which it is applied. 
5. Deploying the framework in the two cases 
We now apply the proposed framework to some management accounting and control 
examples from our cases. As already clarified, this ex-post application: 1) illustrates the 
kind of empirical situations underpinning the development of our framework; 2) 
highlights how the understanding of rules and routines interactions, and in turn the 
understanding of change, is improved by the framework, in the particular area of 
management accounting and control. 
An example from RuleCo 
At RuleCo, among the many changes in practices triggered by the large-scale change 
project, three will be mentioned here: 1) obtaining approval, by the manager with 
appropriate formal authority, before ordering new fixed assets; 2) having a Bill of 
Materials (BOM) / cost information defined before producing any given product; and 3) 
ensuring that acceptance of a new order from a customer does not cause its credit limit to 
be exceeded. Note that this description of practices could be reworded as description of 
rules to be enacted.  
Rules 1 and 3 – arguably, basic financial controls – were formally defined at RuleCo 
before this change process, but central actors expressed concern about local actors not 
enacting them in a consistent way. Failure to accept and enact such rules (in other words, 
the absence of the prescribed practices) created de facto situations in which 
responsibilities towards suppliers and credit risk exposure were created beyond the 
formally sanctioned mechanisms and levels. This ‘problem’ (from a central actors’ 
perspective) was not related with routines, but with the lack of acceptance and enactment 
of rules by local actors. Rule 2 emerged and became necessary after the implementation 
of SAP’s product costing module. Until then, product BOMs were not fully specified due 
to lack of need for operational purposes, and costing was based on information and on a 
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system other than the ones used for operations. However, fully defined BOMs were 
essential for product costing in SAP.  
As detailed in Oliveira (2010), embedding controls in business processes generated 
benefits and incentives to local actors from complying, and disincentives from not 
complying, with the proposed rules. For example, if the Shared Service Centre detected, 
during the administrative steps it carried out preceding an invoice payment, that prior 
authorization to purchase had not been obtained (rule 1), then the SSC could ultimately 
not pay the supplier, thus endangering the flow of local operations and compromising 
local actors’ performance. If local actors attempted to produce items without having the 
BOMs defined (rule 2), entering post-facto that production lot into SAP would be 
complex and highly visible, attracting negative attention upon the noncomplying actors. 
It should be highlighted that resistance was not totally absent, with some local actors 
expressing dissatisfaction regarding rules whose enactment was more likely to trigger 
resistance because conflicting with their local-level interests. For example, some local 
actors argued that enacting rule 1 could cause delays in purchase processes. However, 
overall, not only there was an increasing emergence of a fundamental belief that the 
existence of central control devices was natural in a large company like RuleCo, but also 
embedding control within everyday business processes reduced the perception of control 
– as well as the possibilities of circumventing it. These factors promoted an increased 
disposition among local actors to accept centrally defined rules such as the ones 
described, integrating them as internal structures at their cognitive level, to be drawn upon 
in everyday practices. The rules already existed at a formal level, but they were only 
effective to attain the interests of central actors if / when they were accepted and enacted 
by local actors (Hodgson, 2006). Moreover, because rule 3 was technologically embedded 
in SAP, in the material realm, upon each incoming order this non-human actor 
automatically enacted this rule - making the credit check and allowing the order or not. 
Deploying our framework, we can say that rules which became established at the 
psychological and material realms supported the practices envisaged by the central actors 
within management accounting (rule 2) and management control (rules 1 and 3). These 
practices were being consistently repeated in time and space (across the multiple locations 
of RuleCo). Due to the difficulties of empirically evaluating routinization (see Section 
Two), Oliveira (2010) did not claim that routinization had already occurred; however, 
even if not, the emergence of performative and ostensive routines was certainly 
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underway. The conditions promoting the repetition of practices in time and space had 
been structurally set at a psychological and at a technological level. Since the new 
practices had their origin in rules, the RuleCo case illustrates ways in which rules may 
precede routines, mediated through practices repeated in time and space. 
An example from RoutineCo 
RoutineCo adopted a new planning and production system including sales and product 
costing modules. In the previous system, managers and management accountants had 
limited and high-level cost information available. But even after the new system and 
detailed costs became available, changes in cost reporting neither happened immediately, 
nor were they explicitly sought at the start. However, managers gradually came to 
consider that more frequent and detailed cost reporting would improve control and this 
was desirableX. The emergent rule at stake was “we must produce detailed cost reports”, 
a cognitive structure which actors may interpret as, for example, what is “a good report” 
(it should be detailed), “good reporting” (it should be frequent and detailed) or “useful” 
(provide decision relevant information). This constitutes the psychological realm. 
According to the orientation for action provided by this psychological dimension (the 
accepted rule of the need to produce cost reports with the above characteristics), managers 
went on to shape the information system to embed this rule in it (through software 
parameterization or customization), or at least select from the material rules pre-
programmed within the software. Managers and management accountants met, agreed on 
a detailed template of cost classifications and adjusted the software as needed - this 
included using a custom report writing tool called Crystal Reports. At this stage, 
conditions at the psychological and material realms were set, which both enabled and 
constrained possibilities of action. Within this structural context of accepted and encoded 
rules, the management accounting practice of producing the cost report took place. 
Through rules enactment, the first report was issued when the system went live, and 
subsequently occurred on a monthly basis. As we already argued, when a practice is first 
performed, it is premature to suggest that a routine is already in place (cf. van der Steen, 
2011). Only after the report was repeatedly produced (the intermediate concept at the 
framework core, in the action realm) each month according to the accepted and encoded 
rules, did this practice eventually achieve a routine status.  
The above example illustrates the unpacking of rules and routines in our framework. If 
we explore this example without our understanding of rule and routine interactions, our 
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interpretation is incomplete. We cannot say that managers at RoutineCo discussing how 
to produce a cost report constitutes a routine, as such behaviours do not satisfy the 
definition of routines as set out Pentland (2011). Yet, an agreed understanding of how to 
create a useful cost report emerged, and this we term a cognitive structure, a rule not 
documented or formalized at this stage yet. Thus, in comparison to our previous 
knowledge, we can now trace the emergence of a routine from a shared cognitive structure 
within the team, which also became materialized through encoding in the report writing 
software. Together, the psychological and material realms shaped practices which became 
repeated in time and space, and ultimately became routinized. In contrast to Quinn (2011), 
who states that (formal and written) rules need not always existXI, we can now explain 
how the routines noted by him came about through rules (as cognitive structures and 
through their encoding in technology) and practices, rather than simply accept that 
routines (as repeated organizational practices) are prevalent in an organization. 
Adopting our broader definition of rules, the examples from RuleCo and RoutineCo, 
highlight the notion that routines are underpinned by rules. The examples also portray the 
difficulties in claiming a practice is routinized; however, in both cases practices had been 
repeated and we can at least state that the emergence of performative and ostensive 
routines was underway. Over time, these practices may gain inertia, automaticity and 
become sedimented (see Section Two). Without the framework in Figure 1, we could not 
see the ‘full picture’ as conveyed in these examples. The advantage of now having a 
‘fuller’ picture is that we can at least reconcile our cases in rule and routine terms, despite 
what appeared to be different approaches to change.  
6. Final comments 
Our framework offers several potential contributions to the furtherance of OIE-based 
research in management accounting drawing on rules and routines. Recent literature has 
tended to concentrate less on, or even neglect, rules, but here we have shown that both 
rules and routines are relevant to our understanding of management accounting change. 
We adopted a wider conception of rules, going beyond formal rules. This wider 
conception also includes rules as internal cognitive structures orienting action, and the 
material realm of technologically embedded rules, to account for the pervading influence 
of technology on the practices of contemporary organisations.  
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We have argued that rules are an essential component in the formation of routines and 
both our cases suggest that rules underpin routines and should remain a focus of 
management accounting research. To this end, we encourage further research into how 
management accounting rules become accepted in organizations. Fruitful lines of 
research may include exploring how the material realm may also affect rules acceptance 
(and not only rules enactment) and introducing intra-organisational diversity, as in 
Oliveira and Nixon (2014). In contrast, research where no apparent technological material 
realm exists may prove fruitful. In our cases, technology played a key role in the 
acceptance of rules and the ultimate emergence of routines. More research may provide 
other factors which influence the action and psychological realms. We also encourage 
further empirical research on the distinction between repeated practices and routines, and 
on the factors which may sediment repeated practices into becoming routines. Finally, we 
also encourage empirical research on how processes we described may not unfold, 
become interrupted or divert from their original direction, problematizing the reinforcing 
cycle underpinning our synthetic framework and thus bringing a more realistic view of 
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I Hodgson (2006, p. 7) used the expression “reconstitutive downward causation” but recently revised his 
terminology and replaced “causation” by “effects” to avoid a misleading suggestion of a deterministic 
mechanism (Hodgson, 2012). 
II Other theoretical approaches with affinities to institutional theory have made and addressed similar 
calls. Examples include structuration theory, institutional logics, practice theory (e.g., Giddens, 1984, 
Englund et al., 2011; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; Ahrens and Chapman, 2006) and Actor-Network 
Theory (ANT), with its focus on micro-level relations (e.g., Callon, 1986). Such approaches are beyond 
the scope of this paper, which, while drawing on ANT’s concept of non-human actors, remains focused 
on institutional theory and, in particular, on rules and routines. 
III Hodgson (2008, p. 19) argues that “routines are not behaviour; they are stored capacities or 
capabilities”, suggesting routines are separate from action - see also Burns’ (2009) view of routines as 
dispositions. Hodgson does, however, state that “routines depend upon a structured group of individuals, 
each with habits of a particular kind” (Hodgson, 2008, p. 22). 
IV “[M]uch of what really matters (note: not necessarily much of what happens) in organizations has to do 
with exceptions (…), rather than routines, and these exceptions require intentional deliberation and 
rationality” (Felin and Foss, 2009, p. 164). This argument is not central to this paper, but it suggests that 
an excessive focus on routines may ignore key drivers of organizational life. Furthermore, as Felin and 
Foss (2009) point out, responses to exceptions may over time become part of organizational routines. 
V Felin and Foss (2011) argued that repetition and experience are not a convincing explanatory, ultimate 
source of routines. Instead, they argued that repetition and experience are merely epiphenomena of 
thoughts and deliberations, which are more ultimate causes of behavior and hence deserve the main focus. 
However, Pentland (2011) cited empirical research to strongly disagree. We are not engaging in this 
debate, but our arguments approach us to Felin and Foss (2011) here.  
VI Were formal rules to be depicted in the framework, they might be included in a wider conceptualization 
of the material realm, alongside technologically embedded rules, or in an additional material realm 
accounting exclusively for them. Since these plausible alternatives would introduce additional complexity 
and could risk the framework to lose some focus, we preferred to only explicitly relate the material realm 
with technology (one of the innovative perspectives of the framework) and omit formal rules. 
VII The introduction and acceptance of rules in a particular social context (e.g. an organization) is itself a 
worthy research topic (see Oliveira, 2010 and Oliveira and Nixon, 2014), but beyond the scope this paper.  
VIII Technology is not infinitely flexible to accommodate whatever rules human actors may wish (Volkoff 
et al., 2007). However, we argue that parameterization capacities of contemporary software such as ERPs 
provide significant flexibility to embed most rules envisaged by organizational actors, through the 
selection amongst the multiple alternatives offered by the software. 
IX It could be argued that all connection lines are tentative and thus should be represented by dotted lines. 
However, the relationships between rules and routines, and between ostensive and performative routines, 
have been well previously documented, and are therefore represented by solid lines. 
X We acknowledge that this unitary view of organizations, endorsing the managerial perspective, 
overlooks diversity within organizations. The crude simplification of a unitary view, common to other 
frameworks such as B&S, merely intends to focus the discussion on the concepts and relations between 
rules and routines. See Oliveira and Nixon (2014) for a related approach explicitly accounting for intra-
organizational diversity. 
XI We are not stating Quinn (2011) was incorrect in his analysis. However, the restricted definition of 
rules he used lead him to draw on the ostensive routine as a guiding structure to ‘replace’ formal rules, 
which were inexistent in the empirical setting he researched at RoutineCo. 
                                                 
